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Further, the Court holds, that entry and subsequent holding of land
through mistake as to the true boundary is not adverse holding. But
if, as contended here, such entry and possession should be regarded
by the Court as adverse possession, regardless of whether or not the
entry was made by mistake, then the Statute of Limitations should
start running at the time of such entry.
An undesirable result of the Kentucky cases is that they allow
acquisition of title to land in cases where the land was willfully taken,
thus rewarding the wrongdoer, and deny acquisition in cases where
possession was taken with no intent to deprive the titleholder of title
without compensation, thus penalizing the innocent taker for not
intending to take more than that to which he had title. Public policy
would seem to require that the innocent taker be given at least as
adequate protection as the willful taker. The Statute of Limitations
was not passed to enable wrongdoers to deliberately take another's
land, therefore, something akin to a "felonious" intent should not be
required to acquire title by adverse possession."
JAmzs M. TERRY
PARTIAL ASSIGNMENTS IN KENTUCKY-THE RULE IN HENRY
CLAY FIRE INS. CO. v. DENKER'S EXR.
Partial assignments without the consent of the obligor are not
enforceable at law, because if the debtor originally contracted to pay
in soido, the creditor cannot, by partial assignment, subject him to
more than one law suit.'
Equity courts, however, have always recognized the partial as-
signee- and such has been the growth of the equitable recognition
accorded him that today he is as adequately protected in most juris:
dictions as the total assignee. Equity courts generally allow him a
bill to enforce an unpaid debt, provided he joins his assignor,
3 and if
the obligor pays the whole debt to the assignor after notice of the
partial assignment, the assignee may hold him liable.
4
The Kentucky court, for the most part, has been very generous in
its recognition of the partial assignee. It shared the common con-
fusion of the state courts caused by Mandeville v. Welch,' and said
broadly in Weinstock v. BeZlwood,7 that no cause of action could arise
on a partial assignment. But in a long line of decisions, and especially
in those beginning with Columbia Finance and Trwt Co. v. First Nati.
Bank,8 the court seemed to follow "the tendency of modern decisions
... in the direction of more fully protecting the equitable rights of
the assignees of choses in action."'
A notable and recent exception, however, is the decision in Henry
Clay Fire Ins. Oro. v. Denker's EBxr.
1 In that case there was an assign-
ment, by written contract and for valuable consideration, of part of
the amount due the assignor on a fire insurance policy. Written notice
Co. v. Cline and York, 185 Ky. 528, 215 S. W. 538 (1919); Combs, et al.
v. Ezell, et al., 232 Ky. 602, 24 S. W. (2d) 301 (1930).
10 City of Rock Springs v. Gus Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 Pac. 908
(1929).
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of the assignment was given the company, which acknowledged its
receipt, but did not indicate any acceptance of the assignment. Later
the insurance company paid the full amount of the policy to the as-
signor who converted the whole sum, left the state and was insolvent
at the time the assignee sued the insurance company. The Court of
Appeals, reversing the decision of the lower court, held that the as-
signee could not recover, because a partial assignment without the
consent of the obligor is a nullity as against him, and "no cause of
action arises in favor of the proposed assignee against the debtor."
The court based its holding on a text quotation" and the decisions
in Weinstoce v. Bellwood and Kentucky4 Lumber and Millwork v.
Montz," all of which are rather dubious authority for the point. The
text quotation has been called "clearly erroneous";2" the reference to
Kentucky Lumber and Millwork v. Montz, is only to what is there
dictum;" and the decision of Weinstock v. Bellwood, based on an early
interpretation of Mandeville v. Welch, had later been impliedly dis-
tinguished by the court itself in Columbia Finance and Trust Co. v.
First Natl. Bank, as applying only to the legal rights of a partial as-
signee as contrasted with his equitable rights.
Moreover, the opinion ignores an excellent line of decisions grant-
ing equitable recognition to the partial assignee in many situations.
In many of the cases the question of whether acceptance is necessary
to create an effective partial assignment is not at issue, but in Just's
Admx. v. Woodman," the court held valid an assignment of $200 from
a trust fund, of which the obliger had knowledge but which had never
been formally accepted by him. The court there said:
"An order drawn upon a debtor for valuable consideration, payable
12 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1937), Sec. 442.
22 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1937), See. 443.
3 2 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1937), Sec. 443.
'12 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1937), See. 444.
'Note (Pratt), 13 Corn. L. Q. 129.
65 Wheat. 277 (U. S., 1820).
175 Ky. (12 Bush) 139 (1876). See also dictum interpreting
Mandeville v. Welch, in Buckner v. Sayre, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 746,
756 (1857).
16 Ky. 364, 76 S. W. 156, 25 K. L. R. 561 (1903).
'Risley v. Phenix Bank of the City of New York, 83 N. Y. 318,
329 (1881).
16218 Ky. 68, 290 S. W. 1047 (1927).
n5 C. J. 925: "By the great weight of authority an order drawn
on a debtor for a part of a fund in his hands and unaccepted by him,
will not operate as an equitable assignment of part of the fund as
against the drawee, even though drawn on a particular fund specified."
"158 Ky. 328, 164 S. W. 935 (1914).
o80 A. L. R. 425; Cf. 5 C. J. 925 with 6 C. J. S. 1114.
"The court here recognized a partial assignment which had been
accepted. Any statement in regard to unaccepted partial assignments
was dictum. This dictum is interesting in that the court, in quoting
Cyc. to prove that partial assignments were recognizable in equity in-
cluded a statement which a later court seized upon to show it was not.
147 Ky. 493, 144 S. W. 379 (1912).
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out of a designated fund, or debt, actually due or to become due,
operates, when delivered to the payee, as an equitable assignment
or appropriation of such fund pro tanto and no acceptance by the
drawee is necessary to its validity."
In cases other than those involving an acceptance by the obligor
and where the parties are properly before a court of equity, the rights
of a partial assignee have been recognized and fully protected in many
situations. He has been protected against a subsequent total assign-
ment,- and given preference over a subsequent partial assignee.Y
He has been preferred over subsequently attaching creditors," and over
a subsequent mortgage of the assignor's interests."
The question of whether a partial assignee could bring a bill in
equity against an obligor to enforce payment of an unpaid obligation
has never been squarely before the Kentucky court. In Snelling V.
Boyd,n while it refused to allow an action for specific performance
by two partial assignees, each of whom had a half interest derived
through different assignors from the original assignor, the court put
the decision on the ground that the previous assignors should have
been joined, since in an equitable action all parties to be bound should
be before the court. The implication seems clearly to be that the
partial assignee could sue in equity if he joined the other parties
to the transaction. In Miller v. Maloney, the court allowed the partial
assignee to bring a bill in equity to have his partial assignment set
off against a judgment secured against him by the obligor. "A chan-
cellor," said the court, "is never controlled by the legal assignability
of the instrument evidencing the demand, but looks to the use and
affords remedy to those who are equitably entitled to the money due."
Since Henry Clay Fire Insurance Co. v. Denker's Exr., there has
been no clear case to show how far the court will follow its decision
and dictum in that case. In Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Dunn,2 and
Stewart v. Continental Casualty Co.," the court held that certain wage
assignments for payment of insurance premiums were not effective in
the absence of the employers' acceptance, but this would be a necessary
holding under the Kentucky statuteO' requiring an acceptance in the
case of wage assignments.
2Lexington Brewing Co. v. Hamon, 155 Ky. 328, 160 S. W. 264
(1913).
11Columbia Finance and Trust Co. v. First Natl. Bank, supra,
n. 8.
.Newby v. Hill, 59 Ky. (2 Mete.) 530 (1859); Lutter v. Grosse,
26 K. L. R. 585, 82 S. W. 278 (1904); Kentucky Lumber and Mill
Work v. Montz, supra, n. 12.
"107 Ky. 492, 54 S. W. 854, 21 K. L. R. 1212 (1900). But see
Summers v. Kilgus, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 449 (1879).
21 Ky. (5 T. B. Mon.) 172 (1827).
242 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 105 (1842).
"219 Ky. 103, 292 S. W. 742 (1927).
-229 Ky. 634, 17 S. W. (2d) 745 (1929).
"Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), Sec. 4758a-2: "No such instrument
(written assignment of wages to be paid in the future where the con-
sideration for the assignment is less than $200) shall be valid against
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In Patternson v. Miracle, the court recognized a partial assign-
ment as effective over a subsequent attachment, finding an acceptance
of the assignment by the local agent of the insurance company, and
presuming that the local agent had the authority to do so in the
absence of a showing to the contrary. This possibly indicates a desire
on the part of the court to avoid the result of the decision in Henry
Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Denker's Exr.
The rule in Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Denlcer's Exr., is contrary
to the weight of authority in the United States, and in opposition to
the general trend of the law of assignments in the United States and
Kentucky in particular. Reason, as well as practical considerations of
the commercial world, is against it. It is submitted that it should be
restricted as far as possible in the future, if not directly overruled.
PAUL OBERST.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION AS INCOME OF OFFICER'S
SALARY EXEMPT FROM DIMINUTION DURING TERM OF
OFFICE.
The Kentucky Income Tax Act, passed by a special session of
the General Assembly in 1936, provides:
"A tax is hereby annually levied for each taxable year upon
every resident individual of this State upon his entire net income
as herein defined for purposes of taxation. ... ."
Plaintiff, a judge of the circuit court, sought an injunction to
prevent defendant, as state commissioner of revenue, from enforcing
penalties against him because of his failure to file an income tax
report in accordance with the requirements of the statute, contending
that the tax, insofar as it affected his salary as judge, was unconsti-
tutional in that it diminished his compensation during his term of
office in violation of Sections 161 and 235 of the Constitution of Ken-
tucky. Held (three judges dissenting, by a special Court of Appeals,
the judges of the regular court having declared themselves disqualified
to act), that the tax did not diminish plaintiff's compensation during
his term of office within the meaning of the State Constitution, and
that the act was therefore valid.3 The undiminished compensation
guaranteed by the Constitution, the court said, means compensation
as such, and not "exemption of public officials from any tax that is
levied on any other citizen of Kentucky ... The Commonwealth,
the employer of the person to whom such wages are payable unless and
until said employer shall signify in writing upon said instrument his
assent to said assignment ... "
U253 Ky. 347, 69 S. W. (2d) 708 (1934).
'Ky. Stats. (Carroll, 1936), § 4281lb14.
2Ky. Const., § 161: "The compensation of any city, county, town,
or municipal officer shall not be changed after his election or appoint-
ment, or during his term of office." Id., § 235: "Salaries of public
officers shall not be changed during the terms for which they were
elected."
'Martin, Commissioner of Revenue v. Wolfford, 269 Ky. 411, 107
S. W. (2d) 267 (1937).
